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1  | INTRODUC TION
A recurring challenge in crisis management is how to develop an 
adequate information position (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 
2005). Gathering and sharing up-to-date information about the 
crisis is needed to develop and maintain shared awareness of the 
situation (Klein, Wiggins, & Dominguez, 2010). It also ensures that 
those involved stay informed about how the response organiza-
tion is progressing (Deverell, Alvinius, & Hede, 2019; Treurniet, van 
Buul-Besseling, & Wolbers, 2012), and enables them to develop op-
tions regarding how to intervene (Pfaff et al., 2013). Developing an 
adequate and shared information position requires a collaborative 
effort by multiple response organizations. Response organizations 
need to address operational, tactical and strategic issues simultane-
ously in a rapidly changing environment (Owen, Brooks, Bearman, 
& Curnin, 2016), which often leads to ambiguity and discontinuity 
(Wolbers, Boersma, & Groenewegen, 2018).
In the language of crisis managers, this means using a com-
mon operational picture to tackle the perceived ambiguity and 
enable a shared overview of the crisis and the progress of the 
response operation to be developed (Comfort, Dunn, Johnson, 
Skertich, & Zagorecki, 2004; Copeland, 2008; Endsley, 1995). 
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A key challenge in crisis management is maintaining an adequate information position 
to support coherent decision-making between a range of actors. Such distributed 
decision-making is often supported by a common operational picture that not only 
conveys factual information but also attempts to codify a dynamic and vibrant crisis 
management process. In this paper, we explain why it is so difficult to move from 
information sharing towards support for distributed decision-making. We argue that 
two key processes need to be considered: supporting both the translation of mean-
ing and the transformation of interests between those on the front line and those 
in the remote response network. Our analysis compares the information-sharing 
processes in three large-scale emergency response operations in the Netherlands. 
Results indicate that on several occasions the collaborative decision-making process 
was hampered because actors limited themselves to factual information exchange. 
The decision-making process only succeeds when actors take steps to resolve their 
varying interpretations and interests. This insight offers important lessons for im-
proving information management doctrines and for supporting distributed decision-
making processes.
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Many technological solutions have been suggested for how to 
create and maintain a common operational picture, often stress-
ing the importance of collecting and fusing data (Looney, 2001) 
or of synchronizing and distributing information (Copeland, 2008; 
DeMarco, 2016). Although there are exceptions (Uhr, 2009), 
these technical solutions are generally considered to improve 
the speed and quality of the collaborative decision-making pro-
cess (Comfort, 2007). Accordingly, information management has 
predominantly been approached from a warehousing logic, which 
reveals the assumption that it is possible to collect and store 
all the relevant information, develop a complete overview of 
events and specify what actions need to be taken and by whom 
(Copeland, 2008; DeMarco, 2016; FEMA, 2014; Leedom, 2003). 
Current studies seriously question this assumption (Wolbers & 
Boersma, 2013), as it prevents any substantial progress being 
made on developing a more nuanced information-sharing doctrine 
(Tatham, Spens, & Kovacs, 2017; Wolbers & Boersma, 2019).
Attempts to compile a complete factual overview during a crisis 
generally fail because of an important trade-off in information gath-
ering, which is conceptualized as the "variable disjunction of informa-
tion" (Turner, 1976). By this expression, Turner (1976) means that each 
actor has access to a slightly different set of information, while the 
amount of information that can be combined and processed with avail-
able resources is less than the amount of information needed to cap-
ture the complexity of the situation. This classic trade-off implies that 
during a crisis no actor is able to attain a perfect information position, 
because the cost of obtaining a new piece of information has to be bal-
anced against the cost of obtaining an alternative piece. Paradoxically, 
this means that, in a rapidly changing crisis situation, putting too much 
effort in constructing a complete overview will eventually result in the 
information position becoming outdated, because the situation will 
have already changed significantly by the time the overview is com-
plete. Also, since all the actors collect information to support their own 
decision-making process at the operational, tactical or strategic level, 
different perspectives of the crisis situation are likely to develop.
While the promise of many information-sharing doctrines is to 
support the decision-making processes on the front line, the tactical, 
and the strategic level, decision-making processes at each of these 
levels have a quite different logic, and thus different information 
requirements. Years of research into front-line command highlight 
that commanders rely on recognition-primed decision-making to 
connect cues and information to well-known scripts that they have 
developed from previous experience (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Klein, 
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). This allows them to make quick 
decisions in environments that involve a high level of risk and com-
plexity. In contrast, strategic-level decision makers use information to 
support sense-making processes over a longer time period, engage 
in meaning-making to frame societal impact, and use information to 
claim or redirect accountability (Boin et al.., 2005). These differences 
mean that it is highly challenging for a single information-sharing plat-
form to seamlessly connect the front line and the remote response 
network. The on-scene dynamics and the uncertainties involved ren-
der it virtually impossible to convey an up-to-date situational picture 
that addresses all the aspects that are relevant to those operating 
remotely at the tactical and strategic levels of the response organi-
zation (Bosomworth, Owen, & Curnin, 2017). Likewise, it is very dif-
ficult to express broader tactical and strategic perspectives on the 
situation in a way that is meaningful and manageable at the opera-
tional level (Bye et al., 2019; Curnin & Owen, 2013).
Accordingly, we need more insight into how information is trans-
lated and transformed as it moves between the front line and the 
remote response network at the tactical and strategic level. Against 
this background we ask the research question: how does information 
sharing in a crisis management operation contribute to collaborative de-
cision-making between the front line and the remote response network? 
To answer this question, we studied the information-sharing and 
collaborative decision-making processes during three large-scale 
emergency response operations that took place in the same region 
in the Netherlands.
2  | THEORETIC AL FR AME WORK
It is well known that a crisis management operation consists of dif-
ferent collaborative decision-making processes taking place at the 
operational, tactical and strategic level (Boin et al., 2005; Curnin & 
Owen, 2013; Owen et al., 2016). Chen, Sharman, Rao, and Upadhyaya 
(2008) argue that collaborative decision-making processes in re-
sponse operations can be conceptualized as a number of nested 
decision-making cycles, which we refer to as the front line and remote 
response network. A range of studies describe a tension between the 
front line and the tactical/strategic level (Bosomworth et al., 2017; 
Curnin & Owen, 2013; Owen et al., 2016). Front-line cycles of coor-
dination that support firefighting, acute medical care or police op-
erations involve actions that need an immediate reaction and do not 
allow for lengthy deliberation. Rimstad and Sollid (2015) use the 2011 
Norway terrorist attack to show that front-line operations are charac-
terized by rapid critical decisions, made primarily on the basis of pat-
tern recognition (Cohen-Hatton, Butler, & Honey, 2015; Groenendaal 
& Helsloot, 2018; Klein, 1993; Meso, Troutt, & Rudnicka, 2002). 
These front-line processes can be highly chaotic and unpredictable, 
and may sometimes even be incomprehensible to actors operating at 
a distance (Barton, Sutcliffe, Vogus, & DeWitt, 2015; Boehm, 2018; 
Curnin, Brooks, & Owen, 2020; Nja & Rake, 2009).
The remote response network typically seeks to address the 
broader, long-term impact of the crisis by focusing on the implica-
tions for various stakeholders, resource allocation, and community 
expectations (Curnin, Owen, Paton, & Brooks, 2015). Those at the 
strategic level—generally as part of the remote response network—
focus on meaning-making, which entails offering the broader com-
munity a frame through which the crisis situation can be understood 
(Boin et al., 2005; You & Ju, 2019). Boin, Brown, and Richardson 
(2019) show that in the response to Hurricane Katrina different or-
ganizations and officials communicated different frames, but most 
of these frames had hardly any connection to how the situation was 
experienced by those at the front line.
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As such, the front line and the remote response network can 
be two "worlds in themselves" (Njå & Rake, 2008). While front-line 
processes are driven by "knowledge by acquaintance," the remote 
response network is driven by "knowledge by description" (Baron 
& Misovich, 1999). This is an important difference, and means that 
it is difficult for the organization as a whole to be sensitive to the 
lived experience and concrete situational details to which those at 
the front line have access (Barton et al., 2015). Only as time goes 
on, and more room becomes available for longer deliberation and 
for the facts to be validated, can those at the tactical and strategic 
level use their more overarching risk assessments to provide more 
active guidance to the front-line operations (Rimstad & Sollid, 2015; 
Scholtens, 2008). However, actively steering front-line operations 
too soon generally results in the strategic-level decision makers 
being accused on engaging in micromanagement.
Collaborative decision-making in emergency response is thus a 
multifaceted and nested phenomenon. It is multifaceted in the sense 
that it requires knowledge-intensive transboundary collaboration 
between organizations with differing knowledge bases and exper-
tise. It is nested in the sense that it typically consists of a number 
of interconnected decision-making cycles, differing in their level of 
abstraction and the time pressure involved. The multifaceted and 
nested nature of the collaborative decision-making processes feeds 
into the state of variable disjunction of information among the orga-
nizations contributing to the response (Turner, 1976).
The common operational picture, as an information-sharing 
platform, plays a key role in connecting the perspectives of the 
different teams across organizational boundaries (Ansell, Boin, & 
Keller, 2010), providing an up-to-date representation of the sta-
tus of the emergency situation and the actions taken in response. 
Underlying the discussion of the common operational picture as an 
information-sharing platform is the notion of developing a shared 
situational awareness (O'Brien, Read, & Salmon, 2020). The debate 
on this subject flourished in the 1990s and early 2000s, with a range 
of studies being conducted in aviation and in the naval and military 
domain (Endsley, 1995; Hutchins, 1995; Salmon et al., 2008; Sarter 
& Woods, 1991; Taylor & Selcon, 1990). These studies describe sit-
uational awareness as being acquired through cognitive processes 
that integrate knowledge derived from recurrent situation assess-
ment (Salmon et al., 2008). The debate cumulated in a range of cog-
nitive process models that describe how information is processed 
and evaluated to support decision-making (Bedny & Meister, 1999; 
Endsley, 1995; Smith & Hancock, 1995).
While the debate on shared situational awareness offered a 
predominantly cognitive approach to information sharing, later 
studies showed that information management should be broad-
ened out into a cyclic and collaborative sense-making process that 
feeds into the development of shared situational awareness (Klein 
et al., 2010). During the process of information sharing, it is import-
ant to leave room for different sense-making accounts (Wolbers & 
Boersma, 2013). For different teams and different organizations, dif-
ferent aspects of the situation are relevant. The common operational 
picture should be able to reflect these differences, and a continuous 
process of collaborative framing, questioning and reframing should 
help to reconcile the differing perspectives to arrive at a more con-
sistent, less equivocal view of the situation (Klein et al., 2010). This 
combination of collaborative sense-making and shared situational 
awareness makes collaboration on the basis of a common opera-
tional picture both complex and effective.
As the common operational picture is intended to support the 
transboundary collaboration between the front line and remote re-
sponse network (Comfort et al., 2004), its supporting role is more 
problematic than is often suggested in the literature. The infor-
mation-sharing dilemmas that are experienced in response opera-
tions are often more complex and nuanced than can be captured 
in factual terminology. As such, crisis information management also 
involves more reflective, knowledge-intensive processes, such as 
meaning-making, prioritization, future scenario development and 
considerations of the rationale of the response. However, we know 
relatively little about the processes of sharing these more abstract 
levels of information that play a part in supporting collaborative de-
cision-making (Wolbers & Boersma, 2013).
Carlile (2002, 2004) conducted relevant research on information 
sharing in distributed organizations. He distinguishes three levels on 
which information can be shared: the syntactic level of factual infor-
mation, the semantic level of interpretations and the pragmatic level 
of implications that interpreted facts may have for the interests of 
other actors involved. Likewise, crisis management scholars have 
pointed out that translation of the inherent meaning of terms is gen-
erally needed, because meanings and implications of the information 
transferred must be exchanged and coordinated as well (Kalkman, 
Kerstholt, & Roelofs, 2018; Luokkala, Nikander, Korpi, Virrantaus, 
& Torkki, 2017; Merkus et al., 2017; Van de Walle, Brugghemans, & 
Comes, 2016; Wolbers & Boersma, 2013). Others have argued that in-
terests have to be negotiated between collaboration partners (Ansell 
et al., 2010; Wimelius & Engberg, 2015), which means that the con-
textual meaning of information must be transformed. In this paper, we 
take a closer look at information sharing by analysing how using these 
various levels of information sharing contributes to collaborative deci-
sion-making by the front line and the remote response network.
3  | METHOD
We conducted a detailed qualitative analysis of how information shar-
ing supports collaborative decision-making by differentiating between 
different levels of information sharing. We analysed three real-life 
emergency management operations: a gas explosion in an apartment 
building in 2010, a shooting in a shopping mall in 2011 and the col-
lapse of two cranes being used to hoist a bridge deck in 2015. For each 
operation, we examined how the information provided in a common 
operational picture was used to address key collaborative decision-
making challenges. The analysis was complemented by semi-struc-
tured interviews with operational officers involved in one or more of 
the operations. All three cases were sudden-onset crises, the tactical 
lead resided with the same commander, and they took place in the 
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same municipality: Alphen aan den Rijn in the Dutch safety region of 
Hollands-Midden. Evaluation reports and media accounts show that 
the response to all three incidents was successful in several senses 
(McConnell, 2011). First, it followed pre-anticipated and appropriate 
processes and the decisions taken had the effect of minimizing damage 
and loss of life. Second, those decisions ensured that political goals were 
achieved without attracting any substantial opposition. Furthermore, 
the three incidents occurred during a period in which a specific infor-
mation management doctrine, netcentric operations (Alberts, Garstka, 
& Stein, 1999), was being implemented in the Netherlands. In netcentric 
operations, each participating team is responsible for maintaining an 
up-to-date representation of the situation, reflecting the professional 
perspective of that team and for sharing this representation with other 
teams (de Ven, Van Rijk, Essens, & Frinking, 2008). In addition, a new 
role was introduced into the crisis management structure: information 
managers watched over the coherence between the operational, tacti-
cal and strategic command level.
The response to regional-level incidents, like the three we anal-
ysed, is coordinated as follows (Scholtens, 2008). The front-line oper-
ation is coordinated by an on-scene multidisciplinary command team 
in which all the disciplines working directly at the incident location 
are represented. This on-scene command team is led by a field com-
mander, who is supported by an information manager. This informa-
tion manager is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date operational 
picture and sharing it with the rest of the emergency response net-
work. A tactical command team is also established, based well away 
from the incident location. This remote team is responsible for sup-
porting the on-scene operation and for dealing with the broader ef-
fects of the incidents. These include both physical effects, such as 
the spread of smoke or toxic gases, and psychosocial effects, such as 
social unrest and turbulence in social media. This tactical command 
team is led by a tactical commander, who is supported by an infor-
mation management section. The information manager leading this 
section is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date tactical picture 
and for the coherence of the common operational picture as a whole. 
If the incident involves issues that require substantial coordination at 
the municipal level, a strategic coordination team is established. This 
team, which also meets somewhere remote from the incident loca-
tion, is led by the mayor of the municipality or by the chairman of the 
safety region, usually the mayor of the largest city in the safety region.
We collected our data from two different information-sharing 
platforms: the information system of the emergence response cen-
tre (GMS), and the nationwide crisis management system (LCMS). 
The GMS registrations are basically tables in which each row con-
tains one entry extracted from the information system. An entry of 
this type includes a date, a time, the name of the dispatcher and a 
text message. Data from the LCMS reflect a dedicated view for each 
of the teams operating at the different levels of command. Each view 
contains one or more textual fields. For our qualitative analysis, we 
used a chronological list of field mutations extracted from the LCMS. 
Each field mutation consists of an identifier for the view, an identi-
fier for the field, a date/time group, an identifier for the person who 
has modified the field and the contents of the field.
For each of the cases, the contents of the GMS registration and 
the registration exported from LCMS were integrated into one table. 
In this process, the text messages from the GMS registration were 
copied exactly. To incorporate the field modifications from the LCMS 
registration, some manual processing was needed. The marked in-
sertions and deletions had to be converted to a textual description 
capturing the essence of the modification.
We assessed the three cases from a process perspective 
(Langley, 1999). We applied a narrative strategy as a preliminary step 
to prepare a chronology for subsequent analysis. This strategy in-
volves constructing a detailed story from the raw data. Subsequently, 
we aligned the data to the three levels of information sharing: factual 
information, interpretations of the factual information and implications 
that the interpreted facts may have for the interests of other actors 
involved. At the interpretations level, we broke the data down into a 
series of multidisciplinary decision-making themes that were discern-
ible on the information-sharing platforms. At the implications level, 
we examined the choices that needed to be made at the strategic 
level and those that involved deep uncertainty (Walker, Lempert, & 
Kwakkel, 2013), where conflicting interests needed to be weighed 
against each other. By taking this processual approach, which involves 
contextualization of the decisions made, we account for possible hind-
sight bias, which can occur when causal reasoning alone is used to 
explain crisis decision-making (Schakel & Wolbers, 2019).
To reconstruct the information-sharing process over time in each of 
the three cases, we engaged in "recursive cycling among the case data" 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). This entailed going back and 
forth between the empirical data, the templates we used for categori-
zation, and the logic of the narrative. Through this process, we derived 
a coding structure, consisting of a number of themes with underlying 
concepts (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Each of the themes ex-
presses a key collaborative decision-making topic that could be dis-
cerned as a thread running throughout the emergency management 
operation. This coding structure allowed us to visualize the processes 
used to reach different levels of information sharing and to relate them 
to key collaborative decision-making topics (see Appendix).
We validated our initial analysis by conducting a member check 
(Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2009) using reflective interviews with six 
officers involved in one or more of the cases. One of them was the tac-
tical leader of the emergency response in all three cases. Four of them 
were responsible at the operational level for a significant part of the 
decision-making in one or more of the three cases. One was involved 
as information manager in one of the cases. The interviews took place 
in 2016 and 2018 and lasted two to four hours. The visual reconstruc-
tions of the information-sharing process over time formed the main 
input for our conversations with the officers. This visual reconstruction 
helped them to bridge the gaps between the time when the incidents 
occurred and the point at which the reflective interviews took place. 
The officers reflected extensively upon the cases, and identified what 
they had experienced as the toughest episodes and collaborative de-
cision-making issues. They also reviewed our reconstruction of how 
the information-sharing process unfolded and reflected on what role 
the different levels of information sharing had played in addressing the 
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decision-making challenges. Whenever necessary, the underlying data 
was referred to during the sessions. We transcribed and analysed these 
interviews in order to build a richer picture of what had occurred and 
to deconstruct the key challenges in the collaborative decision-mak-
ing processes that we had identified through our document analysis. 
This approach gave us a richer understanding of the collaborative deci-
sion-making process, which we will now describe in detail.
4  | FINDINGS
The three incidents featured as cases in our study occurred in the 
municipality of Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands, on 6 December 
2010, 9 April 2011, and 8 August 2015, respectively. On 6 December 
2010, there was a gas explosion in an apartment building. As a re-
sult of the subsequent fire and the structural damage caused by the 
explosion, the apartment building had to be evacuated. On 9 April 
2011, there was a serious shooting incident in a mall. Seven peo-
ple, including the perpetrator, lost their lives and seventeen were 
wounded. On 8 August 2015, two large cranes toppled over into 
a residential area while a new bridge deck was being hoisted into 
place. A number of houses and shops were damaged or destroyed.
For each of the cases, we provide a short description, and we then 
sketch out a particular collaborative decision-making issue faced by 
the crisis managers. We describe the collaborative decision-making 
dilemma from the perspective of the front line and the remote re-
sponse network. We also describe how the level of information shar-
ing throughout the emergence response organization developed over 
time while this issue was being dealt with and how it was concluded.
4.1 | Arranging emergency accommodation after a 
gas explosion in a residential flat
Monday 6 December 2010 was a mostly cloudy day in the 
Netherlands, with temperatures close to freezing. At 1.01 p.m., the 
emergency room of the Hollands-Midden safety region received 
information about an explosion in a six-storey apartment building in 
Alphen aan den Rijn (Explosion on the sixth floor. Windows have been 
blown out.). After the explosion, a fire broke out in a number of the 
apartments. As a result, and because the explosion had caused struc-
tural damage to the apartment building, the building was evacuated.
The key decision-making topics in this emergency response op-
eration are listed in the Appendix. One of the key topics in which 
information sharing played an essential role in supporting the dis-
tributed decision-making was arranging temporary accommodation 
for the inhabitants of the apartments. In doing so, they faced various 
difficulties to codify the emergent nature of this process. Figure 1 
provides a reconstructed timeline of the accommodation process.
Before the command teams were established, the units on the 
street realized that emergency accommodation would need to be 
arranged. So as to waste no time the staff in the emergency centre 
began arranging emergency accommodation 29 min after the initial 
emergency call was received. The on-scene commander said in the 
interview: It is not really a very explicit intellectual process. It is more 
like a strategy of coincidental opportunities. If the first solution solves 
the problem, that is sufficient. We have other things to do. The emer-
gency centralists registered in their system details of the front-line 
initiatives being taken to arrange emergency accommodation. As it 
is ultimately the responsibility of the municipality to arrange accom-
modation, the municipality officials were alerted in parallel. Eight 
minutes later, a separate process was initiated by the municipality, in 
accordance with its own pre-planned scripts. Another three minutes 
later, the police initiated a third process. Finally, five minutes after 
that, the “De Bron” church centre spontaneously opened its doors 
and started to welcome people who had been affected (De Bron is 
already arranging care).
Three different processes were started in parallel to arrange 
accommodation. Those involved in these three processes quickly 
shared factual information about their decisions, but even small de-
lays in information sharing led to coordination problems due to the 
speed of the action trajectories. The confusion lasted for the next 
70 min. By that time, the centralists in the emergency centre were 
clearly annoyed, as reflected in their use of capitals and exclamation 
F I G U R E  1   Timeline of arranging 
accommodation
01.30 pm 02.30 pm
Timeline of 
frontline
Timeline of remote 
organisaonal
network 02.00 pm
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marks: EMERGENCY ACCOMMODATION DE BRON!!! SOURCE: 
REGIONAL OPERATIONAL TEAM (Figure 2).
The on-scene commander explained in the interview: Initially, we 
had arranged accommodation. After scaling up to the tactical level, the 
tactical team did it all over again, with a different location. So, we decided 
to move the people to this new location. We thought: oh, did they come up 
with something else again, you know? Then the tactical team decided: well, 
all right, let them go back anyway. And the people went back again!
This case shows that accommodation typically has to be arranged 
while the incident command structure is still being established. Thus 
it can often be the case that initiatives are started spontaneously by 
other groups within the local community, running in parallel with the 
activities of the emergency responders. While it is important that 
all the partners involved are informed quickly about initiatives, even 
short delays can easily lead to conflicting actions and agreements at 
the network level. Furthermore, in this particular case sharing fac-
tual information about the locations was not sufficient, as delibera-
tion over choices and the implications of particular choices could not 
be easily codified in the common operational picture. Hence, hav-
ing a common operational picture does not guarantee that that the 
implications of particular decisions will be considered by different 
actors in the response network.
4.2 | Bomb threat after a mall shooting
On Saturday 9 April 2011, at 12.09 p.m., the Hollands-Midden 
safety region received an emergency call: Shooting in the De 
Ridderhof mall! De Ridderhof is in the municipality of Alphen aan 
den Rijn. The call was soon followed by reports of injuries. Police 
units and paramedics rushed to the mall. After a few minutes the 
shooting was over. At 12.19 p.m., it was reported that the gun-
man had committed suicide. In the shooting, seven people, includ-
ing the perpetrator, lost their lives and seventeen were seriously 
injured. At 2.10 p.m., it was confirmed that there had been only 
one perpetrator. Around the same time, an on-site command team 
was established. This team took charge of operational coordina-
tion of response activities at the scene, including attending to the 
wounded, identifying those who had been killed, and undertaking 
forensic investigation.
The main decision-making topics the emergency response orga-
nization had to deal with are listed in the Appendix. As part of the 
safety and security challenge in this incident, a particular episode in 
the information-sharing process played a key role in supporting col-
laborative decision-making. The central question in this episode was 
the following: how to deal with and codify the bomb threat posed 
against the De Ridderhof mall?
At 1.55 p.m., the gunman's car was found with an envelope on 
the passenger seat. After the car had been carefully opened by a 
bomb squad, the envelope was found to contain a bomb threat to 
a number of shopping malls in Alphen aan den Rijn. At that time, 
a forensic team had started its investigation inside De Ridderhof, 
although it was not immediately clear whether the bomb threat in-
cluded De Ridderhof as well. As a precaution, the front-line com-
mander immediately decided to stop the forensic investigation and 
evacuate De Ridderhof. Figure 3 depicts the information exchange 
between the front-line commander and the remote response net-
work. The decision of the front-line commander to evacuate De 
Ridderhof was communicated via the common operational picture 
and is indicated in the figure by bold arrows (implications level). In 
the remote response network, several teams at the tactical and stra-
tegic level started a two-and-a-half-hour deliberation about which 
malls should be evacuated. Factual information about the progress 
of this deliberation was shared through the common operational pic-
ture. The outcome was that it was decided there was no bomb threat 
to De Ridderhof, so clearance was given to proceed with the forensic 
investigation.
The front-line commander at De Ridderhof reflected on this: I 
asked the question: "Are we safe here, yes or no?" This question was ul-
timately even dealt with in the strategic team. Finally they said: "Yes, 
De Ridderhof is safe." By that time, I was, like, what is happening on 
the street, what is happening in the tactical team, what is happening 
in the strategic team? We had been taking measures even before they 
talked about it and decided on it. […] Now the strategic team decided 
De Ridderhof is not at risk. […] This made the forensic investigation team 
ask: "Why is it safe now? Who decides on that? Does the strategic team 
decide that it is safe?" In other words, implications-level information 
from the remote response network did not convince the front-line 
commander and the teams operating there that it was safe to work 
in De Ridderhof.
The forensic investigators would not resume their work until an 
explosives scout had determined that there was no sign of an ex-
plosive device in De Ridderhof. While the front-line commander 
was saying that an explosives scout needed to confirm it was safe 
in order for work to resume, the remote response network was still 
stating that searching for explosives in De Ridderhof was not neces-
sary (Figure 3). This stand-off tells us that even if information about 
the uncertainty over the bomb threat is shared, the lived experience 
of uncertainty is not addressed by simply sharing factual informa-
tion. Safety issues and the urgent need to carry out risk assessments 
are very much dependent on the perspective of the beholder. In this 
case, the front line and the remote response networks seemed to be 
operating in two entirely different worlds.
4.3 | Instability of pontoons
On Monday 8 August 2015, at 4.09 p.m., the emergency centre 
servicing the area of the Hollands-Midden safety region received 
the following call: a crane has fallen down on shops and houses. The 
F I G U R E  2   Irritation reflected in extract from the emergency 
centre registration
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call came from a citizen in the municipality of Alphen aan den Rijn. 
Two heavy cranes were being used to instal a new bridge deck 
across the river Oude Rijn. The cranes were positioned on pon-
toons in the Oude Rijn. At a critical moment in the hoist operation, 
the combination of the cranes and the pontoons became unsta-
ble. Both the cranes and the bridge deck toppled over, destroying 
two shops and two houses on the eastern bank of the Oude Rijn. 
A number of other buildings were also damaged. Given the enor-
mous havoc, it was expected that there could very well be up to 
twenty victims. Miraculously, the only casualty turned out to be 
a dog.
The key decision-making topics the emergency response organi-
zation had to deal with are listed in the Appendix. Whether or not the 
heap of rubble was sufficiently stable, despite of the apparent move-
ment of the pontoons, was one of the key issues in codifying the 
information-sharing process to support distributed decision-making.
Figure 4 depicts the information exchange between the front 
line and the remote response network relating to evacuation and the 
release of addresses during the first 24 hr of the response operation. 
During the first few hours, the front-line commanders struggled to 
assess the stability of the heap of rubble. During that period, the 
front-line commanders communicated factual information about the 
four addresses that had been directly hit by the fallen cranes, as well 
as the 35 other properties that were evacuated for safety reasons. In 
Figure 4, this factual information exchange is shown by thin arrows. 
The front-line commander recalled that he received a phone call 
around 10.00 p.m. from the tactical-level commander, who asked 
why it was not possible to declare some of the evacuated addresses 
safe. The front-line commander replied: We just do not know. Have 
some confidence that we deploy people to investigate the situation, 
but we do not know yet and we cannot be faster than we are now. This 
conversation between the front-line commander and the tactical 
commander—indicated in Figure 4 by the first bold arrow—can be 
characterized as an information exchange at the implications level: 
the front-line officer asked for attention to be paid to the safety of 
the people being evacuated and the tactical officer sought to mini-
mize the disruption to daily life.
Later in the evening, some of the addresses were declared safe 
and the residents were able to return to their homes. By noon the 
next day, 28 of the properties initially evacuated had been declared 
safe. At that point, the front-line commander who had been working 
at the scene the previous evening was called back to the front line. 
He found a situation in which the uncertainty over the mechanical 
stability of the heap of rubble was actually no less than it had been 
F I G U R E  3   Information exchange about 
whether or not to evacuate De Ridderhof
Timeline of 
frontline
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F I G U R E  4   Information exchange 
on the evacuation of addresses and the 
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the evening before, even though a substantial number of houses 
had been declared safe in the meantime. He immediately decided 
to re-evacuate the inhabitants of those houses. In an interview he 
recalled: … really, my basic thought was: how is that possible? That is 
not possible! It is still unstable! It is still moving! The stability has not 
been calculated at all… How could they do this? Another front-line fire 
officer recounted in an interview that The quay joist hung on just four 
screws – tiles [of the pavement] had come upwards. The first re-evacu-
ation was registered in the common operational picture as: CHANGE: 
<address > is being evacuated because of instability of pontoon. In 
Figure 4, this information exchange is indicated by the second bold 
arrow. The first part of the sentence provides factual information 
with respect to evacuation of an address. The second part of the 
sentence conveys implications-level information about the reason 
for the evacuation.
After the initial phase of hectic activity, the emergence response 
organization was faced with the issue of how to deal with an appar-
ently unstable heap of rubble. A delicate assessment had to be made 
as to whether to accept the risk of further collapse or whether to 
continue evacuating houses. The front-line commander reflected on 
this dilemma: I don't argue that the administrative reality is a reality; it 
is very true! Weighing up whether an area has to be evacuated or not… 
I understand it very well! The thing is, perspectives have to be brought 
together. Sharing information in LCMS, in information systems and in 
netcentric collaboration environments is not only about factual informa-
tion. That is where netcentric collaboration fails. It is about common in-
tention, common interests, however you want to look at it. […] Here I was 
bothered by the tactical team because I had been saying, you know, don't 
ask me to speed up, don't push me to work harder and better, because 
I’m really doing as much as I can. Help me above all by asking where you 
can support me, what [our information] really means, and what interpre-
tation can be attached to it! This reflection underlines the differences 
in interpretations—in terms of implications—between those at the 
front line and those in the remote response network. The common 
operational picture did not provide sufficient support to those who 
had to decide between ensuring safety and minimizing disruption 
to daily life. It seemed impossible to codify the complexity and un-
certainty of the situation in the common operational picture, and 
thereby span the boundary between the front line and the remote 
response network.
4.4 | Analysis
Our analysis indicates that information codified in the common op-
erational picture is mostly factual information about the developing 
situation. By factual information, we mean the characteristics of the 
incident and the actions taken by each of the various response or-
ganizations. In general, sharing factual information provides a solid 
basis for collaborative decision-making. However, in each of the 
cases we analysed crisis managers faced periods of confusion in 
which information sharing at the factual level was not sufficient to 
overcome the collaborative decision-making challenges. It required 
information exchange at the level of interpretation and/or at the 
level of implications to provide direction and to bridge the semantic 
or pragmatic boundary between the front line and the remote re-
sponse network. Only after that boundary had been bridged could 
information exchange at the factual level again support the collabo-
rative decision-making process.
If we zoom in on the information exchange between the front 
line and the remote response network, we see that not all front-line 
information can be codified in time to be of use. On the front line, 
rapid decision-making takes place on the basis of pattern recogni-
tion, which is hard to convey. The quick decisions to evacuate im-
mediately after the cranes had collapsed are examples of this. These 
decisions were based on an overall impression of the local situation, 
including the structure of the heap of rubble, the layout and nature 
of the built-up area, the apparent tension in the cables of the cranes 
and the fact that they were attached to the quay. On several oc-
casions, the dynamics of the situation and the uncertainty made it 
difficult to codify the situation in real time. An example of this is the 
rapid decision to abort the forensic investigation immediately after 
it became known that a bomb threat might have been issued against 
De Ridderhof.
In all of our cases, we saw that task differentiation results in 
the variable disjunction of information, which leads to different 
sense-making accounts (Turner, 1976). Even if teams find other 
ways to express and exchange their perspectives, and share their 
views on what implications their actions may have for their in-
terests, differences in sense-making emerge. In other words, if 
different actors or teams are taking different actions in different 
contexts (e.g. on-scene vs. remote), the perceived relevance and 
meaning of the facts may also differ (Barton et al., 2015). An ex-
ample of this is the front-line decision not to resume the forensic 
investigation until after an explosives scout had established that 
there were no signs of any explosive devices, even though the re-
mote response network had already deemed it to be safe. This also 
complicates the flow of information, codified in the common op-
erational picture, from the remote response network to the front 
line. In principle, the perspectives of those at the tactical and stra-
tegic level of the emergency response organization—who are typ-
ically remote from the location of the incident—provide relevant 
context for those at the front line. If those in the remote response 
network do not have a rich and up-to-date view of the situation at 
the scene and of the dilemmas being faced at the front line, it is 
difficult for them to make appropriate decisions about what infor-
mation about the broader context of the incident will be relevant 
to the front-line responders.
5  | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we asked the question: how does information sharing in 
a crisis management operation contribute to collaborative decision-mak-
ing between the front line and the remote response network? Our quali-
tative analysis of the collaborative decision-making processes during 
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three large emergency response operations in the Netherlands has 
increased our understanding of different levels of information shar-
ing during a crisis. We found that the information codified in a com-
mon operational picture to support distributed decision-making was 
predominantly factual. At the time when the three cases in our study 
took place, those involved were gaining experience of collaborating 
on the basis of a new information management doctrine. The tacti-
cal officer in charge of all three cases explained that their growing 
understanding of how to work with this netcentric operations doc-
trine helped to mitigate the variable disjunction of information and 
contributed directly to the coherence of the emergency response. In 
many academic discussions, however, the warehousing philosophy 
of information sharing, in which factual information is conveyed, has 
been presented too categorically as an enabler of transboundary de-
cision-making (Cinque, Esposito, Fiorentino, Carrasco, & Matarese, 
2015; Copeland, 2008; DeMarco, 2016). Our analysis shows that, in 
particular, the differences between the decision-making dynamic of 
the front line and the remote response network cannot be bridged 
completely by sharing factual information. The information acquired 
by the front line, as well as the uncertainty inherent in that infor-
mation, cannot always be codified in time or in sufficient detail to 
provide the remote response network with input for tactical and 
strategic-level decision-making (Barton et al., 2015). As a result, 
especially in dynamic and chaotic circumstances, the front line and 
the remote response network can easily be operating in two worlds 
(Rimstad & Sollid, 2015).
A practical implication of our findings is that both the front-line 
staff and those in the remote response network should be aware of 
the different levels of information sharing and should be hesitant 
about relying too quickly or too extensively on sharing factual in-
formation via a technical platform. In order to stimulate tactical and 
strategic sense-making, it may take deliberate acts of sense-giving, 
sense-demanding and sense-breaking to advance understanding 
(Vlaar, Fenema, & Tiwari, 2008). Although information-sharing plat-
forms certainly do play a role in reducing the variable disjunction of 
information at the level of factual information (Turner, 1976), richer 
forms of information sharing are needed to bridge semantic and 
pragmatic boundaries. Establishing direct radio links and telephone 
and video connections might be useful to provide a platform to share 
concerns that are more implicit, more complex, and that have hith-
erto been tacit. Indeed, Barton and Sutcliffe (2009) stress the impor-
tance of voicing concerns that may emerge in a collaborative effort 
in order to overcome dysfunctional momentum of the collaborative 
process.
Our findings complement the work of Wolbers and Boersma 
(2013), who argue that a common operational picture should be re-
garded as a trading zone rather than an information warehouse used 
in the exchange of factual information. While their study focused 
predominantly on the level of interpretations, we extend this dis-
cussion by adding the level of interest into the information-sharing 
process. Building on the conceptualization of information exchange 
made by Carlile (2004), our study indicates that, in the trading zone, 
actors are not only having to negotiate regarding the different 
meanings but also need to negotiate regarding the different impli-
cations that a particular piece of information, and any collaborative 
decisions taken in response to it, may have for their own function-
ing or the functioning of others. Particularly in parts of the emer-
gency response organization where there is ample time to gather 
and transfer information and where careful thought can be given 
to how information is translated and transformed, the integrative 
framework proposed by Carlile (2004) for managing information can 
be readily applied.
A practical implication of this insight is that stagnation in the 
collaborative decision-making process may be overcome by delib-
erately shifting the focus to the interpretation or implications level 
of information exchange. The emergency response organization 
should be very precise in terms of how it uses terminology. Lack of 
clarity over terms may be indicative of a misunderstanding between 
organizations, and time may be required to reach agreement on the 
interpretation. More complex negotiation of interests is needed at 
the implications level to develop creative and transboundary prob-
lem solving (Leonard-Barton, 1995). The development of multidis-
ciplinary scenarios may be necessary in such cases to provide the 
insights needed. Overall, the information-sharing infrastructure 
provides sufficient support for sharing factual information and en-
gaging in rule-based decision-making. However, to support more 
transboundary collaborative decision-making, which requires more 
extensive deliberation of dilemmas and insight into the perspectives 
of other actors, additional methods of information sharing are likely 
to be required to overcome the semantic and pragmatic boundaries 
that are in place.
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APPENDIX 
CODING S TRUC TURE S
Table A1 provides the code structure for the gas explosion case. The GMS registration consisted of 205 entries. For technical reasons, 
in this particular case there were no LCMS data available for analysis, but the LCMS did not play a very significant role in the Hollands-
Midden safety region by that time, either. The on-scene command team did not even have access to the system. The decision-making 
process was based mainly on spoken accounts from team members and was captured in periodic meeting reports, and decision lists were 
a more important source of information. A seven-page decision list was available to complement the emergency centre registration. This 
decision list summarized the decisions taken by the team in charge of the tactical coordination.
Table A2 provides the coding structure for the mall shooting case. The GMS registration consisted of 39 pages, and the registration ex-
ported from LCMS consisted of 506 pages. The registrations contained 865 and 468 entries, respectively.
TA B L E  A 1   Coding structure for the gas explosion case
Key decision-making topics Codes
Access restriction Crime scene; CS; access control; raising of the barrier
Asbestos Asbestos
Emergency accommodation De Bron; Troubadourweg; Limeshal; Kees Musterstraat (details of accommodation)
Activation of municipal crisis organization Municipality
Return of residents House; release of building; apartment; utilities (energy, gas, electricity)
Victim list 1,000 (code for deceased person); victim; deceased; wounded
Stability of the apartment building Stability; construction of building; structural condition; danger of collapse
Key decision-making topics Codes
Public sentiments Horror; bad news coverage; outrage; empathy; hearsay; 
rumours; sick minds; dismay; disrespect; understanding; 
speechless; compliment; amazement; disbelief; homage; 
criticism
Victim list Number of casualties; victim overview; registration of 
casualties; triage category; identification/identity of 
casualties; information about hospitalized victims
Target groups Victims; relatives; shopkeepers; neighbourhood residents; 
schools; general public
Harmonization of crisis 
communication
Information number; calling
Emergency accommodation Emergency accommodation; emergency care; De Bron; 
Limeshal; police station; 30 (code for police station)
Multidisciplinary organization Unit status; substitution; logistics; allocation of tasks and 
responsibilities; lines of command
Foreign affairs Foreign countries; international; Syrian (the ethnic 
background of one of the victims)
Safety and security Crime scene; safety and security of emergency workers; 
safety and security of bystanders and general public; 
precautionary measures
Transition to normalized situation Prognosis; handover to project organization; aftercare
Psychosocial support Psychosocial support to emergency workers; psychosocial 
support to others involved; fire service mental support 
team
Disaster tourism Disaster tourism
Looking after properties Real estate; goods left behind in the rush to leave
TA B L E  A 2   Coding structure for the 
mall shooting case
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Table A3 provides the coding structure for the collapsed cranes case. The GMS registration consisted of 24 pages, and the registration 
exported from LCMS consisted of 1,240 pages. The registrations contained 540 and 510 entries, respectively.
Key decision-making 
topics Codes
Status of the various 
addresses
Street names; address; house; shop; building; utilities (gas, electricity)
Movement of 
pontoons
Stable; stability; movement; buckling of the quay
Victim list Victims; wounded; persons; victim information system
Emergency 
accommodation
Emergency accommodation; location indicators (Chinese restaurant; 
restaurant “De Meiden”; Tulip Inn; Avifauna; Goede Herderkerk 
[Good Shepherd Church]; Schiphol); persons
Communication Communication; message; informing; meeting; press; media
Access restriction Crime scene; emergency regulation; investigation; investigation 




Aftercare; follow-up phase; project; scaling down
TA B L E  A 3   Coding structure for the 
collapsed cranes case
